Mongol Army: How it All Started : Life History

Genghis Khan

Mongol Army: How it All Started : Life History

Mongol army

Few armies in history have a reputation asfearsome as those of the Mongol Empire. During the height of the empire, (xue talahai) the Mongol Horde carried a well-earned reputation for invincibility, inflicting devastation uponenemy armies and cities. So thorough was this carnage that many writerswho experienced it first hand could only describe it as a punishment sent by Heaven: for howelse could one explain how so many cities and armies fell so quickly? In our next series of article , we will attemptto do just that, explaining various aspects of the medieval Mongol military, and providinginsight as to what made the horsemen of the Great Khan so successful. By the way, did you know that we have a wholepodcast dedicated to the History of the Mongols? Because we do! And you can find the link to it in the descriptionand the pinned comment! Our first episode will provide an overviewof the evolution of the thirteenth century Mongolian military, offering a brief comparisonto earlier and later steppe armies. The Mongols are of course most well knownfor their horse archers, the byproduct of their lifestyle. In the great grass seas of the Eurasian steppe,the Mongols and other nomads spent their entire lives on horseback, learning to ride beforethey could walk in order to manage their great herds of sheep, goat, oxen, camels, and horses. A lifetime in the saddle in the often harshconditions of Inner Asia left the nomads excellent riders with incredible endurance, able toendure hardships beyond that of sedentary peoples. Each Mongol learned to shoot and constructtheir bows and arrows from a young age, beginning with a child’s bow to hunt marmots and smallmammals, gradually increasing the strength of the bow until able to master the powerful,composite recurve war bow. Highly mobile, deadly at range, and strategicallyswift compared to infantry armies, the horse archer, when used properly, could be the masterof the medieval battlefield. Many aspects of the above description of nomadiclife and warfare as mounted archers, are easily recognizable to a scholar of earlier nomadicsteppe peoples like the Xiongnu and Scythians. This Chinese description of the Xiongnu inthe 2nd century BC is just as applicable to the Mongols well over a thousand years later: “The little boys start out by learning toride sheep and shoot birds and rats with a bow and arrow, and when they get a littleolder they shoot foxes and hares, which are used for food. Thus all the young men are able to use a bowand act as armed cavalry in time of war. It is their custom to herd their flocks intimes of peace and make their living by hunting, but in periods of crisis they take up armsand go off on plundering and marauding expeditions.

This seems to be their inborn nature. For long-range weapons they use bows and arrows,and swords and spears at close range. If the battle is going well for them theywill advance, but if not, they will retreat, for they do not consider it a disgrace torun away. Their only concern is self-advantage, andthey know nothing of propriety or righteousness.” For these earlier peoples, many of the samebasic tenets of mounted warfare were utilized by both them and the Mongols, such as hitand run tactics, envelopment, and the infamous feigned retreat.Mongol warrior found himself better equipped than his forebears, in the form of several technological advancements to their tack and weapons. The Scythians, for instance, had only softpadded saddles for their mounts. Essentially two leather pads held to the horsewith a girth strap, it provided minimal shock absorption for the rider and little for himto maintain his place beyond his thighs. The Xiongnu and Huns were better supplied with the development of the treed saddle, a sturdy wooden frame cushioned for the rider. It was a more secure base for the archer toshoot from, which also made it more difficult to unhorse him. Leaning into the front of these saddles liftedthem, allowing the hips to absorb more of the shocks from riding and reduce jostlingfrom the horse’s movement. What these early riders lacked, from the Xiongnu and Huns to the Parthians and the Romans, was the paired stirrup. When the stirrup emerged is a matter of controversy-the earliest stirrups were made of materials like wood which do not preserve well archaeologically. But it seems likely the stirrup, in a formeasily recognizable today, was developed around the third century AD in northern China or Mongol ia, spreading west via Turkic tribes, arriving in Europe with the Avars by the sixthcentury. Stirrups provided several advantages: theyprovided a much more secure platform, allowing the rider to raise himself in the saddle forextra leverage and reach in close combat, or for the horse archer to stand and use hisleg and core muscles to help draw heavier bows. Further, the knees could better absorb thejolts from the horse’s movement and guide the horse in the heat of battle. Outside of combat the benefits were more significant,particularly for the nomad. Needing to be on horseback all day while tendingtheir herds, the stirrup helps take pressure off of the horse’s back. A skilled rider on a strong horse could nowtravel further and longer. When coupled with multiple remounts, the distancehorsemen could march rose dramatically. The famed weapon of the horse archer was theircomposite bows. Rather than a self bow, such as the Welshlongbow, which is made from a single piece of wood, the composite bow was made from layersof wood, horn and sinew. The horn and sinew increased the strengthof the bow, transferring more energy to the arrow. Most composite bows of the steppe world werealso recurved, the “ears” of the bows storing yet more energy while providing leverageto aid the archer. Whereas a self bows strength can only be increasedby making the bow larger or the archer stronger, the recurve composite bow remains relativelyshort without sacrificing power. The shorter bow made it more maneuverableon horseback, allowing Mongol warriors to even travel with heavier and lighter bowson them as the situation required. The composite bow was however in danger ofwarping from prolonged exposure to humidity; not an issue in the generally dry steppesof Central Asia, but in wetter climates dangerous to the bow’s health. To offset this, bows of the Xiongnu and Hunshad the ends of their limbs strengthened with bone plates to reduce warping, but this madethe bow heavier and decreased arrow velocity. In contrast, Mongol bows of the conquest eralacked bone plates, transferring more energy to the arrows and granting them greater penetrativepower and range, but making them more susceptible to climate changes, perhaps accounting inpart for reduced Mongol military effectiveness in South East Asia and Europe. Despite some modern claims, the Mongol conquestswere not a result of a technological innovation in horse archery, as the technology itselfhad changed little once these above mentioned developments were completed by the 4-5th centuries AD. For that, we must look to the military leadershipof the Mongols and their innovations upon existing steppe traditions. Many aspects of this we will explore in thenext videos in this series. Beyond these technological changes, the Mongolarmy of the 13th century shared many traits with steppe armies of the preceding centuries. The method of organizing armies using thedecimal system was present among the Xiongnu: the highest commanders led divisions nominallyof 10,000, while the smallest were squads of just 10 men who operated together. Traditionally this system was based withinthe tribe, but it was the innovation of Chinggis Khan to largely break down the tribes of Mongol iaand almost entirely replace them with the decimal system, removing minor chiefs and Khans from power to ensure no alternatives to his rule. Earlier steppe confederations like the Xiongnu generally had an important imperial bodyguard and retinue which often provided a numberof the major leaders and generals of the empire. For the Mongol, this was originally the nöködof Temujin, the basis for the famed keshig, which he expanded upon when he took the titleof Chinggis Khan in 1206. The keshig under the Mongol evolved beyondjust bodyguards, but into a general staff, where top officers learned the ropes of command. From there they were appointed not only tolead armies, but to conquer and govern regions as the Mongol Empire expanded, and acted asimportant administrators. Sons of the royal families of subject kingdom swere taken into the keshig as hostages, to help secure the loyalty of their dynasty,but also to be essentially indoctrinated in Mongol imperial destiny.

Going through trials alongside the Mongol sand amply rewarded, when they returned to their homelands they were loyal servants ofthe Khan who helped to uphold his rule. While the following article will detail thematter of Mongol ian military tactics more fully, the following example should proveillustrative of how Chinggis Khan innovated upon and evolved, rather than invented, traditionalnomadic lifestyle and tactics. All nomadic horsemen learned to hunt froma young age; a means to protect their herds from predators and provide extra sustenancefor their families. It also proved an excellent means to practicefor war. For the Khitans of the Liao Dynasty and the Mongol, large scale hunting expeditions served as training for unit operations. In an operation called nerge [e more likeeh than uh] by the Mongols, an army of horsemen would form a rough circle, at times severaldays journey in diameter, gradually tightening and driving all game before them into an arena,where the nobility would take their pick of the hunt before leaving the rest to the men. While simple on paper, organizing this properlytook considerable skill. Given the size of the operation, a time tablewas set for each group, operating in their military units, to reach their destinationand begin to push the game forward. To prevent animals from escaping, the variousunits had to be in contact and be coordinating to prevent holes in the line which would allowherds to slip through their grasp; allowing animals to escape resulted in punishments. Following orders, meeting time tables, unittactics, and discipline were the basic building blocks of Mongol successes, and what allowedtheir armies to outmaneuver their foes. While large scale hunting expeditions werepracticed across the Eurasian steppe, and its rules applied to warfare and battles,under the Mongol the nerge itself became a military strategy. Time and time again a nerge was set over anentire region, designating a major city to be the meeting point. Mongol units would spread across the region,attacking small towns and villages, driving the rural populations towards the major cityas the nerge tightened. Refugees fled into the city, not just overwhelmingits resources and thus reducing the length of the siege it could withstand, but alsosewing chaos and confusion, for the terrified population brought stories of Mongol atrocitiesand spread fear, increasing the chance the city would submit rather than face Mongol wrath. Mongol army structure will also be exploredin an upcoming video, but to detail its evolution over the 13th century we will give it a briefoverview. At the founding of the Mongol Empire in 1206,perhaps the entirety of the Mongol army was lightly armoured horse archers, made up ofthe Mongol ian and Turkic tribes who had submitted or been conquered up to that point. The keshig may have had heavier armour, butwere still armed with their powerful bows, closing with the enemy only once they hadbeen weakened by arrows. Chinggis Khan understood well the effectivenessof this force in the open field, but upon his first campaign against a sedentary society,that being the Tangut Kingdom of Xi Xia in 1209, he found that unless he could draw theenemy from their walls through a feigned retreat or starve them out, that fortifications couldprove impassable. With his invasion of the Jurchen Jin Dynastyin 1211, a solution presented itself in the mass defections of Jin forces to his army. Not just Khitans, a Mongolic people who loathedthe Jin and were themselves skilled horse archers, but also numerous Han Chinese, whoprovided the Mongol with infantry, crossbowmen, and numbers. More significant was the defection of Chinesecatapult specialists and engineers; one of whom, Xue Talahai, defected to the Mongol searly in the invasion, and was rewarded handsomely for sharing his knowledge, teams, and experience. Further capture of Chinese engineers, stonemasons,and carpenters brought further knowledge of how to attack cities and build siege equipment. This adoption of warriors and knowledge ofdefectors, vassals, and captives proved perhaps the greatest deviation from earlier nomadicempires. In order to conquer not just the fringes ofsedentary states, as per earlier nomadic empires, but the sedentary state itself, the Mongol srequired the manpower and knowledge of those sedentary societies. Each culture the Mongol encountered, andconquered, provided them new resources and tools for their arsenal. With the Mongol themselves remaining primarilylight horse archers, they used Northern Chinese and Iranian infantry and siege engineers,Southern Chinese and Korean naval knowledge, Khitan, Jurchen and Turkic horse archers,Armenian and Georgian heavy cavalry, and more. Within a few years of the start of the Mongol conquests, the Mongol leadership and Mongol-Turkic army core of horse archers was supported bya large, heterogeneous army. Able to pick the most effective tactics, weapons,armours, and warriors from the cultures of Eurasia, the Mongol ian army was thus ableto adapt to a variety of situations, well beyond what earlier nomadic empires couldaccomplish. It was the job of subject peoples to fillthe military roles the Mongol themselves either could not fill, or had no interestin filling themselves. The poor Khwarezmian defense in 1220 can beexplained in part as the Khwarezm-shah Muhammad anticipating pillaging horse archers, nota large, disciplined army, ably utilizing siege weapons and technology. The Mongol also showed themselves willingto use gunpowder weapons in their wars in China, a subject we will explore in a futurevideo as well. The Mongol Empire fractured in the secondhalf of the 13th century. Debate rages as to how the Mongol ian militaryin each independent Khanate continued to develop, and to what extent they were influenced bylocal military tradition. Generally, the debate steers towards questioningif the Mongol converted to heavier forms of cavalry. The presence of true Mongol ian heavy cavalryin the early years of the empire is not universally accepted, with it often said that the small Mongol ian horse lacked the strength to carry heavy armour. In the Ilkhanate, scholars like A.P. Martinezhave suggested the Mongols adopted medium or heavy cavalry to better contend with Mamlukforces, and artwork from the Ilkhanate shows a preponderance of heavily armoured Mongol ian forces. An aspect of this argument is that the Mongol seven began to sedentarize in the Ilkhanate, abandoning nomadism altogether, while theirhorses mixed with larger Persian breeds in order to carry the greater weight of armour,but making them less suited to the open steppe. Other scholars such as Reuven Amitai havefound the argument unconvincing, suggesting that it remained the job of oft-mentionedArmenian and Georgian vassals to act as heavy cavalry while the Mongol themselves continuedas light horse archers. Similar arguments have been put forth forthe Mongol within the Yuan Dynasty, where it has been suggested that Mongol troops adornedheavier armour taken from stores of the fallen Song Dynasty. In the territories of the Golden Horde and Chagatai Khanate, where Turkic influence and access to the steppes was greatest, therecan be no doubt in the continued predominance of light horse archers. By the latter half of the 14th century, itwas lightly armoured Chagatayid horse archers which Temur led to begin his conquests. Much like Chinggis Khan, Temur incorporatedoutsiders into his army to utilize their skills and knowledge, overcoming the deficienciesthat came from an army entirely of horse archers. Despite a growth in the percentage of heavycavalry in Central Asia, in the steppe, heavy armour remained difficult and expensive tomanufacture and maintain, especially for the average nomad. The vast majority of post-Mongol successorstates, from the Northern Yuan, the Timurids, the Kazakhs, to the Crimean Khanate, saw theirwarriors continue to fight in a fashion recognizable not just to the Mongol of the 13th century,but to the Gokturks of the 7th century, the Huns of the 4th century, to the Xiongnu andeven the Scythians. The Mongol conquests were not a result ofa sudden transformation in the technology and lifestyle of nomadism, but of skilledleadership innovating upon existing customs and taking advantage of the tools of bothnomadic and sedentary cultures. This is what allowed the Mongol to expandfar beyond the scope of earlier nomadic empires,

Contemporaries to these earlier peoples remarkon their endurance and hardiness, their skill as horsemen, and the danger of their arrows. There are however, several aspects in whichthe