Battle of Greece 1940: Mussolini Attacks World War II : Life History
Battle of Greece 1940: Mussolini Attacks World War II : Life History
The epic battles of the Eastern and WesternFronts, as well as the War in the Pacific, often are central to the depictions of World War II. ! The wake of the 20th century saw Italian nationalists pressing for the expansion of their empire. The recently unified Kingdom of Italy wasstriving to form a powerful colonial empire, with Italian Somaliland and Eritrea amongthe first colonies to be established overseas.
During the Italo-Ottoman war of 1911, Italy occupied the largely-Greek Dodecanese islands and annexed the province of Libya in North Africa. For their participation in World War I, theywere promised the provinces of Trento, South Tyrol and Dalmatia, the Austrian Littoral,parts of western Carniola, and the German colonies in Africa. At the end of the war, they didn’t receiveall of the land that was promised, causing the Italian government to be humiliated. This “mutilated victory”, as it was calledby Italian nationalists, led to the rise of Fascism in the kingdom, with their leader,Benito Mussolini, becoming Prime Minister in 1922.
Mussolini desired to forge a new Roman Empirein Africa and the Balkans, and wanted to achieve supremacy over the Mediterranean, where theirsphere of influence was based. At the same time, a defeat against burgeoning Turkey in 1922 had thrown Greece into a chaotic state in which the monarchy was over thrownand several revolutions and counter revolutions ensued. In 1935, the Royalists, with the help of the British, restored King George II to the Greek throne, but the country was still in a periodof crisis.
The King, instead of attempting to solve thecrisis through parliamentary means, called on Ioannis Metaxas, a former army generalwith pro-Fascist ideas, to form a new cabinet. On August 4th 1936, the new Metaxas regimeabolished the constitution and the political parties, and set up a dictatorship.
Metaxas, now the Prime Minister in this Fascistgovernment, sought to establish order back to his country, although this didn’t bendthe democratic spirit of the Greek people. As the outbreak of war was looming over Europe,Metaxas followed a policy of neutrality and close relationships with the other Mediterraneanpowers. Italian-Greek relations had never been particularlygood, but relations worsened after the Italian invasion of Albania, which gave them a footholdin the Balkans.
The presence of Mussolini’s troops at theGreco-Albanian border threw the Greeks into the arms of the British, to whom they werealso economically dependent. This resulted in the acceptance of a British guarantee of independence on April 13th. The start of World War 2, however, reverse dItalian plans for a Greek invasion, as in 1940 they were fighting the British in North Africa, as well as in the Mediterranean, and couldn't open another front.
But Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Ministerand Mussolini’s son-in-law, had other plans. He exercised much control over Albanian governor Francesco Jomini and military commander Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, and saw Albania as his ownpersonal domain. Ciano believed that he could increase hispopularity in Albania by adding territories with Albanian minorities in Greece and Yugoslavia,coinciding with Mussolini’s expansionist desires.
Mussolini was finally convinced by the assassinationof the Albanian leader in Northern Greece, Daout Hoxha, and an invasion was planned forthe end of September. Visconti Prasca started moving Italian unitsto the Greek frontier, while Albanian guerillas were armed and trained to disrupt the Greekrear, but the Germans delayed the start of the operation because they wanted to maintainthe status quo in the Balkans.
In response, the Italians tried to force Greece into a reaction that would give them a convenient pretext to invade. Provocations reached their peak in Augustwhen the submarine Delfino torpedoed and sank the HRN destroyer Elli. The Greek authorities feigned ignorance onthe identity of the attackers, but prepared for war. When on the 12th of October 1940 German troopsentered Romania, Mussolini decided to act immediately, proclaiming October 26th as theday of the invasion.
Although Il Duce was furious because Romaniawas in the Italian sphere of influence, the German interest in the Balkans prevented Turkeyfrom coming to Greece’s aid, and this allowed the dictator to declare war on them. On October 22nd, Ciano drew up an ultimatumto be presented to Metaxas, intended to leave Greece no way out: either occupation or war. Metaxas, answered with his famous “Oxhi!”or “no”. Six days later some 140,000 men, under torrentialrain, invaded Greece along a 90-mile ffront
They believed the invasion would be fast andwould face around 36,000 Greeks, enjoying a three to one advantage against the defenders. To the surprise of the Italians, the politicaldivisions in Greece were temporarily silenced in a mood of national unity as the Greek sswiftly mobilized reservists to the frontlines. At that point the Greek Army fielded one fullymobilized infantry division in Epirus, the 8th Division, commanded by General Charalambos Katsimitros, while the 9th Division was placed at the Yugoslav border. They had no tanks and were low on machine-gunsand artillery.
Supported by other formations, these divisions would have to hold the Italian advance until reinforcements arrived. Only the forces on the border with Bulgariawere not moved, as the Greeks feared the Bulgarians would invade and assist the Italians in theiroffensive. The British, honoring their guarantee, reinforced Crete, as it was very important for them strategically, and sent aircraft, supplies, and money tohelp the Greek cause. Pressed by the Italians in Africa, they weren’table to send land forces.
The frontier was divided by the invaders intothree sectors. The Epirus front, under General Carlo Rossi,ran from the sea to Ioannina and saw the 25th “Ciamuria” Army Corps, composed by the23rd “Ferrara” Division of Mountain Infantry, the 51st “Siena” Division, the “Centauro”Armored Division, the 6th, 7th and 19th Regiments of Cavalry, and the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers,backed by heavy artillery and Blackshirt militias.
The Pindus front in the center had General Mario Girotti’s 3rd “Julia” Division of elite Alpini mountain troops, backed bya machine-gun battalion and mountain artillery. The Eastern Sector ran to the Yugoslavianfrontier and encompassed the area bordered by Korçë, the Italian center in Albania,and Florina, the gateway to Lake Prespa in Greece. Here, in less mountainous terrain, was the26th “Corizza” Army Corps under General Gabriele Nasci, comprised of the 19th “Venezia”,29th “Piedmonte” and 49th “Parma” Divisions, three battalions of Albanian troops,the 101st Machine-Gun Battalion, heavy artillery, and a regiment of tanks. The initial Italian advance of Visconti Prascawas in such strength that it sent the Greek forces on the frontier reeling back.
There, the Greeks had organized the 17-mileElaia-Kalpaki-Kalamas Line in defense of Ioannina, the capital of Epirus. The center of the line was heavily defendedand the left was held with light forces. As the Pindus Mountains gave them shelter,on the right was only a small Evzones detachment, Greece’s famous kilted mountain troops,under Colonel Konstantinos Davakis. At the coast, there was a small two-battaliondetachment led by Major Nikolaos Lioumbas. The Greek Commander-in-Chief Alexandros Papagos,a hero of the Balkan Wars, was placed in command of the defense of the country, and he gaveGeneral Katsimitros complete freedom of action, with the mission to hold off the Italian advanceuntil sufficient forces had been raised for a counteroffensive.
Katsimitros had a difficult decision: to holdon to the Elaia-Kalamas Line, or to retreat towards the second line of defense at thegate of Southern Greece, from Preveza through the river Aliakmonas almost to Salonika. In the end, the Greek General decided to protectIoannina and Epirus, and to take advantage of the easily defendable mountainous terrainthere. Visconti Prasca, on the other hand, plannedto have Rossi’s infantry attack the center of the defensive line, while the “Centauro”Armored Division advanced through the narrow valley of the Kalamas river, attempting anencircling maneuver against their left wing.
This attack would be helped by two similarmaneuvers aiming to encircle Greek forces on the defense line, one in the Pindus Mountainstowards Metsovo, and the other towards Paramythia south of the Kalamas river. Visconti Prasca decided not to make any advanceinto Western Macedonia before the Epirus area could be secured. Despite the bad weather, it was planned thatin a few weeks Epirus would be, in Mussolini’s words, liquidated.
On the first day of the offensive, Rossi sentthe “Siena” division, with some Albanian contingents, to advance south along the coasttowards Paramythia, under the command of General Francisco Rivolta, while the “Ferrara”and “Centauro” divisions advanced into the Elaia-Kalamas sector as far as Kalpaki. They advanced 30 miles after two days, althoughthe Armored Division was hindered by the mountainous mud and was rendered useless for fightingin these conditions. None of these units at first encountered anyresistance, as Papagos approved an initial strategic withdrawal behind the Kalamas river. On November 2nd, the weather improved andthe Italians decided to attack the main defensive line.
The Battle of Elaia-Kalamas started with the“Ferrara” division assaulting the bulk of Katsimitros’ line several times. The harshness of the terrain, and the 8th’shigh morale and fortifications, repelled attack after attack despite the Italians’ air support. On November 5th, Rivolta enjoyed much moresuccess with the crossing of the Kalamas River, slowly advancing southwards and capturingthe port of Igoumenitsa the following day. In response, the Lioumbas detachment had toretreat further south to protect the gateway to Southern Greece. The deepest Italian advance came one day laterwhen the coastal forces occupied the village of Margariti. By November 8th however, the Italian offensivein Epirus had stopped.
At the Pindus Mountains another struggle wasoccurring at the same time. The “Julia” division decisively defeated Davakis’ small detachment by October 29th, and four days later got within 12 miles ofthe vital Metsovo Pass, capturing the city of Konitsa and the villages of Samarina and Vovousa. But the Alpini were slowed down by the foulweather conditions and were forced to stop, calling for reinforcements that never came. Papagos realized the precarious situationon this front and sent reinforcements, including the 1st Division. On November 4th, General Vasileios Vrachnoscommanded this counteroffensive into the Battle of Pindus.
He first occupied Mount Tambouri north ofSamarina, and sent his cavalry in an encircling maneuver behind the town. Surrounded, the “Julia” sustained heavycasualties, but eventually managed to break out of encirclement and started to retreat,calling for reinforcements. Later that day, Vrachnos had managed to reoccupy Samarina and Vovousa, pressing his attack on the depleted “Julia” and completel ydefeating the Alpini division. The 47th “Bari” Division, which was earmarkedto participate in an invasion of Corfu that had to be dropped because of the failure at Epirus, hurried to the Pindus front, but it was already too late. As the Italians retreated, the Greeks had problems of their own.
The supplies for the Greek army in Pinduswere poor or nonexistent, and there weren't even roads by which the army could be supplied. Due to this situation, the civilian populationheroically volunteered to climb the mountains loaded with ammunition and supplies for theGreek forces, fighting side by side with the army. The supply situation for the Italians wasalso abysmal, as the limited capacity of the two main ports, Valona and Durazzo, createda bottleneck for supplies and reinforcements. By November 8th, the retreating Italian forcesstarted a line of defense at Konitsa.
In the following five days, the Greeks launcheda steady offensive and managed to advance into the Albanian-Greek frontier line. A new Greek attack against Konitsa startedon November 13th. The Italians made a stubborn defense, butthree days later they evacuated the city after burning it to the ground. Further more, Visconti Prasca blamed the defeaton the poor quality of the Albanian soldiers, based on the fact that an Albanian regimenthad been decimated in Epirus. This enraged the Albanian Commander, Prenk Pervizi, who protested that the Albanian soldiers were not to be used as cannon fodder.
Mussolini was dissatisfied and decided toreplace Prasca with General Ubaldo Soddu as the supreme commander in Albania. This man started organizing a new defensiveline on the entire front, and then commanded Rivolta to stop the coastal advance and awaitfor the coming of new reinforcements from Italy. The Greeks had won a great victory on the Epirus and Pindus fronts, sending the Italians back to their initial positions at the Albanianfrontier.
Facing more than 5000 casualties, the Italians’morale was severely weakened. With flocks of reinforcements coming fromall over Greece, Papagos started planning a major offensive operation to take the keycity of Korçë. He appointed General Ioannis Pitsikas to leadit, and divided his forces into three Army Corps: the 1st Corps on the coast of Epirus,the 2nd Corps in the Pindus sector, and the 3rd Corps in Western Macedonia with the 9th,10th and 15th Infantry Divisions, backed with artillery in adequate numbers, and with the11th and 13th being transported to reinforce the Corps. Furthermore, Papagos placed the 3rd, 4th and5th Infantry Divisions in reserve. Soddu, on the other hand, reinforced his lineof defense and reorganized his forces into two field armies: the 11th Army at the Epirusfront with the forces of the former 25th Corps, and the remnants of the “Julia’s” Alpinitroops, and General Mario Vercellino’s 9th Army in the Korçë sector, formed out ofthe former 26th Corps, with a reserve composed of the 2nd “Tridentina” Alpine Division,50 tanks from the “Centauro” Division and the 53rd “Arezzo” division. The “Bari” division was placed at thestrategic border post of Erseke, between the northern and southern defensive lines. The balance of power had drastically changedas the Greeks were now twice the number of the Italian forces.
Soddu planned to gain time with this defensivedisposition until the arrival of new reinforcements from Italy, with which he could launch a secondoffensive operation. The arrival of all reinforcements was arrangedto be completed by December, but the Greek offensive caught them by surprise before that. Mount Morovas, with the northern Mount Ivan,belongs to the great Pindus mountain range and forms a barrier covering the city andthe plateau of Korçë. There were only two ways to the Albanian center.
One went north through the valley locatedbetween Morovas and Ivan; and the other ran northwest through the Valley of the Dardhe. Both these two valleys could be accessed fromthe Greek city of Florina, but the whole area had been fortified by the 9th Army with semi-permanentfortifications. For this reason, Pitsikas divided the Korçëfront into two: in the north, the 15th, 9th and the recently arrived 13th Divisions underGeneral Georgios Tsolakoglou’s 3rd Corps, and in the south the “K” Corps commandedby General Georgios Kosmas, with the 10th Division and the 11th in reserve. The plan was for the 15th Division to advancewest towards the Cangonj pass, between Morovas and Ivan, and capture its western exit; whilethe 9th would attack the center of the Italian defense line towards Mount Morovas, and the“K” Corps would penetrate the Italian left and flank the enemy positions atop of Morovas. On November 14th, the Greek forces attackedon the whole front from Lake Prespa to Mount Grammos, directed against the Morovas-Ivanarea.
The main attack was organized against themountainous southern part of the area, where the Italians couldn’t use their armoredforces. Also, the Italians weren’t expecting a Greek offensive so suddenly, and thus they were taken by surprise. By afternoon, the 10th Division took possessionof the Bataros height in Morovas and the villages of Nikolitse and Vozigrad, while the 9th advancedtowards the western bank of the Devolis river. The 15th Division, after a three-and-a-half-hourstruggle, was able to break the Italian defense line and take the Cangonj pass, thus isolatingMount Ivan. 15 miles from Nikolitse, “K” Corps occupiedthe Stavroeides heights on November 15th and fortified their position south of the Valleyof the Dardhe.
At this point, the Albanians under Pervizihad abandoned the front, infuriated by Italian abuse, but Vercellino sent the “Arezzo”Division to reinforce the line of defense. In response, Papagos reinforced the offensivewith the 11th and 13th Divisions. On November 17th, the 9th and 13th Divisionsmoved to occupy the Valley of the Dardhe and the 15th tried to take possession of MountIvan. One day later, the Greeks faced a criticalmoment when the 13th Division had to change the direction of their attack under a heavyrain, and this resulted in a state of disorder and confusion that almost sent the divisioninto retreat, compromising both the 9th and 10th’s rears.
But thanks to the actions of Major Sotirios Moutousis, order was reestablished and the division continued its advance. In reward, Moutousis was granted command ofthe division. After two days of heavy fighting, the Greeksseized the supply lines of the enemy and gradually advanced along the high ridge of Mount Morovasunder artillery fire. Having seized the Valley of the Dardhe andthe valley between Morovas and Ivan by November 20th, Tsolakoglou launched his offensive actionover Korçë, while Kosmas was sent to take the key border post at Erseke, where the 9thArmy’s defensive line ended.
Despite air support, the advantage of a terrainfavorable for defense, and permanent fortifications, Soddu was not able to stabilize a defenseline on the Korçë plateau. Vercellino’s forces would have to retreatfrom the city to Pogradec because they felt threatened by a Greek pincer movement againstKorçë. After a hard-fought fight in which the “Bari”was forced to retreat, the “K” Corps took Erseke on November 21st. One day later, the 15th Division occupied Mount Ivan and the 9th entered Korçë without resistance, being cheered by the Greek nativepopulation. The Greek forces continued to press Soddu’sretreating forces one day later. The Italians made a disorderly retreat towards Ochrida and Elbasan, as well as Klisura and Pogradec. There, they would mount their new defensiveline.
The Fall of Korçë was a devastating blowto the Italian invasion. They had been beaten back by the Greeks andwere now forced to defend in Albania. The city of Korçë was the center of theItalian campaign in the north, and a key supply point for the invaders, and thus losing itheavily demoralized the Italian army. On the contrary, the Greeks’ high moraleand national fervor inspired them to advance further and to launch a new offensive, directedto take the important port of Sarande, and the mountain passes from the northwest tothe northeast of Argyrokastro.
Life history more...
..........................Life History........................
During the Italo-Ottoman war of 1911, Italy occupied the largely-Greek Dodecanese islands and annexed the province of Libya in North Africa. For their participation in World War I, theywere promised the provinces of Trento, South Tyrol and Dalmatia, the Austrian Littoral,parts of western Carniola, and the German colonies in Africa. At the end of the war, they didn’t receiveall of the land that was promised, causing the Italian government to be humiliated. This “mutilated victory”, as it was calledby Italian nationalists, led to the rise of Fascism in the kingdom, with their leader,Benito Mussolini, becoming Prime Minister in 1922.
Mussolini desired to forge a new Roman Empirein Africa and the Balkans, and wanted to achieve supremacy over the Mediterranean, where theirsphere of influence was based. At the same time, a defeat against burgeoning Turkey in 1922 had thrown Greece into a chaotic state in which the monarchy was over thrownand several revolutions and counter revolutions ensued. In 1935, the Royalists, with the help of the British, restored King George II to the Greek throne, but the country was still in a periodof crisis.
The King, instead of attempting to solve thecrisis through parliamentary means, called on Ioannis Metaxas, a former army generalwith pro-Fascist ideas, to form a new cabinet. On August 4th 1936, the new Metaxas regimeabolished the constitution and the political parties, and set up a dictatorship.
Metaxas, now the Prime Minister in this Fascistgovernment, sought to establish order back to his country, although this didn’t bendthe democratic spirit of the Greek people. As the outbreak of war was looming over Europe,Metaxas followed a policy of neutrality and close relationships with the other Mediterraneanpowers. Italian-Greek relations had never been particularlygood, but relations worsened after the Italian invasion of Albania, which gave them a footholdin the Balkans.
The presence of Mussolini’s troops at theGreco-Albanian border threw the Greeks into the arms of the British, to whom they werealso economically dependent. This resulted in the acceptance of a British guarantee of independence on April 13th. The start of World War 2, however, reverse dItalian plans for a Greek invasion, as in 1940 they were fighting the British in North Africa, as well as in the Mediterranean, and couldn't open another front.
But Count Galeazzo Ciano, Foreign Ministerand Mussolini’s son-in-law, had other plans. He exercised much control over Albanian governor Francesco Jomini and military commander Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, and saw Albania as his ownpersonal domain. Ciano believed that he could increase hispopularity in Albania by adding territories with Albanian minorities in Greece and Yugoslavia,coinciding with Mussolini’s expansionist desires.
Mussolini was finally convinced by the assassinationof the Albanian leader in Northern Greece, Daout Hoxha, and an invasion was planned forthe end of September. Visconti Prasca started moving Italian unitsto the Greek frontier, while Albanian guerillas were armed and trained to disrupt the Greekrear, but the Germans delayed the start of the operation because they wanted to maintainthe status quo in the Balkans.
In response, the Italians tried to force Greece into a reaction that would give them a convenient pretext to invade. Provocations reached their peak in Augustwhen the submarine Delfino torpedoed and sank the HRN destroyer Elli. The Greek authorities feigned ignorance onthe identity of the attackers, but prepared for war. When on the 12th of October 1940 German troopsentered Romania, Mussolini decided to act immediately, proclaiming October 26th as theday of the invasion.
Although Il Duce was furious because Romaniawas in the Italian sphere of influence, the German interest in the Balkans prevented Turkeyfrom coming to Greece’s aid, and this allowed the dictator to declare war on them. On October 22nd, Ciano drew up an ultimatumto be presented to Metaxas, intended to leave Greece no way out: either occupation or war. Metaxas, answered with his famous “Oxhi!”or “no”. Six days later some 140,000 men, under torrentialrain, invaded Greece along a 90-mile ffront
They believed the invasion would be fast andwould face around 36,000 Greeks, enjoying a three to one advantage against the defenders. To the surprise of the Italians, the politicaldivisions in Greece were temporarily silenced in a mood of national unity as the Greek sswiftly mobilized reservists to the frontlines. At that point the Greek Army fielded one fullymobilized infantry division in Epirus, the 8th Division, commanded by General Charalambos Katsimitros, while the 9th Division was placed at the Yugoslav border. They had no tanks and were low on machine-gunsand artillery.
Supported by other formations, these divisions would have to hold the Italian advance until reinforcements arrived. Only the forces on the border with Bulgariawere not moved, as the Greeks feared the Bulgarians would invade and assist the Italians in theiroffensive. The British, honoring their guarantee, reinforced Crete, as it was very important for them strategically, and sent aircraft, supplies, and money tohelp the Greek cause. Pressed by the Italians in Africa, they weren’table to send land forces.
The Pindus front in the center had General Mario Girotti’s 3rd “Julia” Division of elite Alpini mountain troops, backed bya machine-gun battalion and mountain artillery. The Eastern Sector ran to the Yugoslavianfrontier and encompassed the area bordered by Korçë, the Italian center in Albania,and Florina, the gateway to Lake Prespa in Greece. Here, in less mountainous terrain, was the26th “Corizza” Army Corps under General Gabriele Nasci, comprised of the 19th “Venezia”,29th “Piedmonte” and 49th “Parma” Divisions, three battalions of Albanian troops,the 101st Machine-Gun Battalion, heavy artillery, and a regiment of tanks. The initial Italian advance of Visconti Prascawas in such strength that it sent the Greek forces on the frontier reeling back.
There, the Greeks had organized the 17-mileElaia-Kalpaki-Kalamas Line in defense of Ioannina, the capital of Epirus. The center of the line was heavily defendedand the left was held with light forces. As the Pindus Mountains gave them shelter,on the right was only a small Evzones detachment, Greece’s famous kilted mountain troops,under Colonel Konstantinos Davakis. At the coast, there was a small two-battaliondetachment led by Major Nikolaos Lioumbas. The Greek Commander-in-Chief Alexandros Papagos,a hero of the Balkan Wars, was placed in command of the defense of the country, and he gaveGeneral Katsimitros complete freedom of action, with the mission to hold off the Italian advanceuntil sufficient forces had been raised for a counteroffensive.
Katsimitros had a difficult decision: to holdon to the Elaia-Kalamas Line, or to retreat towards the second line of defense at thegate of Southern Greece, from Preveza through the river Aliakmonas almost to Salonika. In the end, the Greek General decided to protectIoannina and Epirus, and to take advantage of the easily defendable mountainous terrainthere. Visconti Prasca, on the other hand, plannedto have Rossi’s infantry attack the center of the defensive line, while the “Centauro”Armored Division advanced through the narrow valley of the Kalamas river, attempting anencircling maneuver against their left wing.
This attack would be helped by two similarmaneuvers aiming to encircle Greek forces on the defense line, one in the Pindus Mountainstowards Metsovo, and the other towards Paramythia south of the Kalamas river. Visconti Prasca decided not to make any advanceinto Western Macedonia before the Epirus area could be secured. Despite the bad weather, it was planned thatin a few weeks Epirus would be, in Mussolini’s words, liquidated.
On the first day of the offensive, Rossi sentthe “Siena” division, with some Albanian contingents, to advance south along the coasttowards Paramythia, under the command of General Francisco Rivolta, while the “Ferrara”and “Centauro” divisions advanced into the Elaia-Kalamas sector as far as Kalpaki. They advanced 30 miles after two days, althoughthe Armored Division was hindered by the mountainous mud and was rendered useless for fightingin these conditions. None of these units at first encountered anyresistance, as Papagos approved an initial strategic withdrawal behind the Kalamas river. On November 2nd, the weather improved andthe Italians decided to attack the main defensive line.
The Battle of Elaia-Kalamas started with the“Ferrara” division assaulting the bulk of Katsimitros’ line several times. The harshness of the terrain, and the 8th’shigh morale and fortifications, repelled attack after attack despite the Italians’ air support. On November 5th, Rivolta enjoyed much moresuccess with the crossing of the Kalamas River, slowly advancing southwards and capturingthe port of Igoumenitsa the following day. In response, the Lioumbas detachment had toretreat further south to protect the gateway to Southern Greece. The deepest Italian advance came one day laterwhen the coastal forces occupied the village of Margariti. By November 8th however, the Italian offensivein Epirus had stopped.
At the Pindus Mountains another struggle wasoccurring at the same time. The “Julia” division decisively defeated Davakis’ small detachment by October 29th, and four days later got within 12 miles ofthe vital Metsovo Pass, capturing the city of Konitsa and the villages of Samarina and Vovousa. But the Alpini were slowed down by the foulweather conditions and were forced to stop, calling for reinforcements that never came. Papagos realized the precarious situationon this front and sent reinforcements, including the 1st Division. On November 4th, General Vasileios Vrachnoscommanded this counteroffensive into the Battle of Pindus.
He first occupied Mount Tambouri north ofSamarina, and sent his cavalry in an encircling maneuver behind the town. Surrounded, the “Julia” sustained heavycasualties, but eventually managed to break out of encirclement and started to retreat,calling for reinforcements. Later that day, Vrachnos had managed to reoccupy Samarina and Vovousa, pressing his attack on the depleted “Julia” and completel ydefeating the Alpini division. The 47th “Bari” Division, which was earmarkedto participate in an invasion of Corfu that had to be dropped because of the failure at Epirus, hurried to the Pindus front, but it was already too late. As the Italians retreated, the Greeks had problems of their own.
The supplies for the Greek army in Pinduswere poor or nonexistent, and there weren't even roads by which the army could be supplied. Due to this situation, the civilian populationheroically volunteered to climb the mountains loaded with ammunition and supplies for theGreek forces, fighting side by side with the army. The supply situation for the Italians wasalso abysmal, as the limited capacity of the two main ports, Valona and Durazzo, createda bottleneck for supplies and reinforcements. By November 8th, the retreating Italian forcesstarted a line of defense at Konitsa.
In the following five days, the Greeks launcheda steady offensive and managed to advance into the Albanian-Greek frontier line. A new Greek attack against Konitsa startedon November 13th. The Italians made a stubborn defense, butthree days later they evacuated the city after burning it to the ground. Further more, Visconti Prasca blamed the defeaton the poor quality of the Albanian soldiers, based on the fact that an Albanian regimenthad been decimated in Epirus. This enraged the Albanian Commander, Prenk Pervizi, who protested that the Albanian soldiers were not to be used as cannon fodder.
Mussolini was dissatisfied and decided toreplace Prasca with General Ubaldo Soddu as the supreme commander in Albania. This man started organizing a new defensiveline on the entire front, and then commanded Rivolta to stop the coastal advance and awaitfor the coming of new reinforcements from Italy. The Greeks had won a great victory on the Epirus and Pindus fronts, sending the Italians back to their initial positions at the Albanianfrontier.
Facing more than 5000 casualties, the Italians’morale was severely weakened. With flocks of reinforcements coming fromall over Greece, Papagos started planning a major offensive operation to take the keycity of Korçë. He appointed General Ioannis Pitsikas to leadit, and divided his forces into three Army Corps: the 1st Corps on the coast of Epirus,the 2nd Corps in the Pindus sector, and the 3rd Corps in Western Macedonia with the 9th,10th and 15th Infantry Divisions, backed with artillery in adequate numbers, and with the11th and 13th being transported to reinforce the Corps. Furthermore, Papagos placed the 3rd, 4th and5th Infantry Divisions in reserve. Soddu, on the other hand, reinforced his lineof defense and reorganized his forces into two field armies: the 11th Army at the Epirusfront with the forces of the former 25th Corps, and the remnants of the “Julia’s” Alpinitroops, and General Mario Vercellino’s 9th Army in the Korçë sector, formed out ofthe former 26th Corps, with a reserve composed of the 2nd “Tridentina” Alpine Division,50 tanks from the “Centauro” Division and the 53rd “Arezzo” division. The “Bari” division was placed at thestrategic border post of Erseke, between the northern and southern defensive lines. The balance of power had drastically changedas the Greeks were now twice the number of the Italian forces.
Soddu planned to gain time with this defensivedisposition until the arrival of new reinforcements from Italy, with which he could launch a secondoffensive operation. The arrival of all reinforcements was arrangedto be completed by December, but the Greek offensive caught them by surprise before that. Mount Morovas, with the northern Mount Ivan,belongs to the great Pindus mountain range and forms a barrier covering the city andthe plateau of Korçë. There were only two ways to the Albanian center.
One went north through the valley locatedbetween Morovas and Ivan; and the other ran northwest through the Valley of the Dardhe. Both these two valleys could be accessed fromthe Greek city of Florina, but the whole area had been fortified by the 9th Army with semi-permanentfortifications. For this reason, Pitsikas divided the Korçëfront into two: in the north, the 15th, 9th and the recently arrived 13th Divisions underGeneral Georgios Tsolakoglou’s 3rd Corps, and in the south the “K” Corps commandedby General Georgios Kosmas, with the 10th Division and the 11th in reserve. The plan was for the 15th Division to advancewest towards the Cangonj pass, between Morovas and Ivan, and capture its western exit; whilethe 9th would attack the center of the Italian defense line towards Mount Morovas, and the“K” Corps would penetrate the Italian left and flank the enemy positions atop of Morovas. On November 14th, the Greek forces attackedon the whole front from Lake Prespa to Mount Grammos, directed against the Morovas-Ivanarea.
The main attack was organized against themountainous southern part of the area, where the Italians couldn’t use their armoredforces. Also, the Italians weren’t expecting a Greek offensive so suddenly, and thus they were taken by surprise. By afternoon, the 10th Division took possessionof the Bataros height in Morovas and the villages of Nikolitse and Vozigrad, while the 9th advancedtowards the western bank of the Devolis river. The 15th Division, after a three-and-a-half-hourstruggle, was able to break the Italian defense line and take the Cangonj pass, thus isolatingMount Ivan. 15 miles from Nikolitse, “K” Corps occupiedthe Stavroeides heights on November 15th and fortified their position south of the Valleyof the Dardhe.
At this point, the Albanians under Pervizihad abandoned the front, infuriated by Italian abuse, but Vercellino sent the “Arezzo”Division to reinforce the line of defense. In response, Papagos reinforced the offensivewith the 11th and 13th Divisions. On November 17th, the 9th and 13th Divisionsmoved to occupy the Valley of the Dardhe and the 15th tried to take possession of MountIvan. One day later, the Greeks faced a criticalmoment when the 13th Division had to change the direction of their attack under a heavyrain, and this resulted in a state of disorder and confusion that almost sent the divisioninto retreat, compromising both the 9th and 10th’s rears.
But thanks to the actions of Major Sotirios Moutousis, order was reestablished and the division continued its advance. In reward, Moutousis was granted command ofthe division. After two days of heavy fighting, the Greeksseized the supply lines of the enemy and gradually advanced along the high ridge of Mount Morovasunder artillery fire. Having seized the Valley of the Dardhe andthe valley between Morovas and Ivan by November 20th, Tsolakoglou launched his offensive actionover Korçë, while Kosmas was sent to take the key border post at Erseke, where the 9thArmy’s defensive line ended.
Despite air support, the advantage of a terrainfavorable for defense, and permanent fortifications, Soddu was not able to stabilize a defenseline on the Korçë plateau. Vercellino’s forces would have to retreatfrom the city to Pogradec because they felt threatened by a Greek pincer movement againstKorçë. After a hard-fought fight in which the “Bari”was forced to retreat, the “K” Corps took Erseke on November 21st. One day later, the 15th Division occupied Mount Ivan and the 9th entered Korçë without resistance, being cheered by the Greek nativepopulation. The Greek forces continued to press Soddu’sretreating forces one day later. The Italians made a disorderly retreat towards Ochrida and Elbasan, as well as Klisura and Pogradec. There, they would mount their new defensiveline.
The Fall of Korçë was a devastating blowto the Italian invasion. They had been beaten back by the Greeks andwere now forced to defend in Albania. The city of Korçë was the center of theItalian campaign in the north, and a key supply point for the invaders, and thus losing itheavily demoralized the Italian army. On the contrary, the Greeks’ high moraleand national fervor inspired them to advance further and to launch a new offensive, directedto take the important port of Sarande, and the mountain passes from the northwest tothe northeast of Argyrokastro.
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